Study: North Korean birth rates lower than UN data shows, NK officials have more kids
Korean working paper looks at the three-decade collapse of North Korea's birth rate – and why NK elite families are different
According to a Bank of Korea working paper, North Korea's fertility rate fell from 2.53 children per woman in the 1980s to 1.39 in the 2010s. The country shares fertility patterns with upper-middle-income nations while remaining low-income.
Researchers Jooyung Lee and Kiho Kim analyzed North Korea's demographic shift through interviews with 1,610 defectors in their study, 'An Empirical Approach to the Causes of Low Fertility Rate in North Korea.'
By the numbers:
1980s: 2.53 children per woman
1990s: 1.88 children (-0.65)
2000s: 1.55 children (-0.33)
2010s: 1.39 children (-0.16)
The research shows these estimates are consistently lower than UN projections:
1990s: 0.29 children lower than UN estimates
2000s: 0.41 children lower
2010s: 0.46 children lower
Why it matters: North Korea's fertility rate is now close to its neighbors:
North Korea: 1.39-1.86
China: 1.70
Japan: 1.39
South Korea: 1.14
Taiwan: 1.10
Behind the decline
The data reveals three distinct periods of fertility decline in North Korea, each with its own driving forces and social dynamics, revealing how the country's demographic transition unfolded.
The 1990s marked the first major shift, dominated by the "March of Hardship" - North Korea's devastating famine period. During this time, total fertility fell by 0.65 children per woman, with the key driver being a dramatic drop in fertility among married women (contributing -0.69). Marriage rates during this period showed a slight positive contribution (+0.02), while non-married fertility also made a small positive contribution (+0.02). This pattern suggests the economic crisis directly impacted families' decisions and ability to have children, even while traditional marriage patterns held steady. Analysis shows married women's fertility dropped especially sharply in the prime childbearing ages of 25-29 and 30-34 years.
The 2000s saw a more complex picture emerge as multiple factors began working together, producing a decline of 0.33 children per woman from the previous decade. The period showed significant changes in marriage patterns and married women's fertility rates. Marriage rates now contributed negatively (-0.17) to the decline, a substantial shift from their positive contribution in the 1990s. Married women's fertility continued to fall slower than before (-0.19 contribution). In contrast, non-married fertility maintained its small positive contribution (+0.03). This period represents a transition as the economic crisis's immediate effects began transforming into longer-term social changes, affecting marriage and childbearing decisions.
By the 2010s, the pattern had shifted dramatically, with marriage rates becoming dominant in the continuing fertility decline, which fell another 0.16 children per woman from the 2000s. During this period, changing marriage behavior became the largest contributor (-0.16), while married women's fertility showed only a minor negative effect (-0.03). Non-married fertility maintained its small positive contribution (+0.03). The marriage impact became particularly pronounced in urban areas, and Pyongyang, where delayed and forgone marriages grew increasingly common. Data shows the cumulative marriage rate by age 29 dropped from 93% for 1960s-born women to 82% for 1980s-born women, while marriage by age 34 fell from 98% to 92%. This suggests a deeper social transformation as younger generations approached marriage and family formation fundamentally differently from their parents, especially in urban areas where emerging market activities had the strongest influence.
These three periods reflect not just numerical changes but a fundamental transformation in North Korean society, from an immediate crisis response in the 1990s to deeper structural changes in marriage and family formation patterns by the 2010s.
Generational differences
The 1970s generation shows distinctly different patterns from the 1960s generation:
By age 39, the 1960s cohort averaged 1.89 children.
1970s cohort averaged 1.63 children
Marriage by age 29 dropped from 93% (1960s) to 82% (1980s)
Key factors affecting fertility
Research reveals four major drivers of North Korea's fertility decline, each operating through distinct mechanisms and with varying impacts across different social groups.
Market Activities have emerged as a powerful force shaping fertility decisions, particularly among women engaged in merchant activities. Statistical analysis using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that market participation affects fertility through direct characteristics (-0.0050) and deeper structural factors (-0.0119). Women working in markets face unique challenges: the intensifying competition in marketplaces makes taking time off for childbirth increasingly tricky. At the same time, early morning to late evening working hours create significant childcare challenges. The proportion of women engaged in market activities increased substantially between generations – from 10% of 1960s-born women to 23% of 1970s-born women – amplifying this effect's impact on overall fertility. Defector interviews reveal market vendors often struggle to maintain their trading positions during pregnancy or early childcare, creating strong disincentives for second children.
Urban Residence has become increasingly associated with lower fertility through complex pathways. The statistical decomposition shows living in cities contributes to lower fertility through structural factors (-0.0080) despite positive attribute differences (+0.0027). This urban effect operates through several channels: cities have become centers of commerce, raising consumption standards and creating pressure for higher incomes; education costs have risen dramatically, particularly in cities, as market forces penetrate the education system; and urban families increasingly focus resources on a single child's education rather than having multiple children. The effect is particularly pronounced in Pyongyang, where stable public distribution systems ironically may reduce the economic incentives for marriage among working women, as they can maintain living standards without family support.
Officials' spouse status positively influences fertility, operating against the general downward trend. Women married to officials show higher fertility rates despite negative attribute differences (-0.0083) due to a strong positive structural effect (+0.0127). This reflects several advantages: officials maintain access to state resources and stable incomes; military officers can purchase necessities at state-set prices; enterprise managers have opportunities for stable income through various channels; and party cadres, police, and prosecutors often access additional resources through their positions. These advantages provide economic security that supports higher fertility decisions.
Education, particularly college education, consistently shows a strong negative relationship with fertility across all analytical approaches. This effect holds true across generations and remains significant even when controlling for other factors. The impact of education works through multiple channels: it tends to delay marriage, increase individual autonomy in family decisions, and raise the opportunity costs of childbearing. While education's effect is consistent across decades, its impact may strengthen as market reforms create more opportunities for educated women outside traditional family roles. The college-educated proportion has remained stable at around 24% across generations. Still, their fertility patterns increasingly diverge from less-educated groups.
These factors interact with and reinforce each other, creating complex patterns of fertility decline that vary across social groups and regions. The analysis suggests that North Korea's fertility transition combines crisis-driven responses and modernization-related changes, producing a unique pattern of demographic change that reflects the country's distinctive social and economic evolution.
Bottomline
North Korea's fertility decline combines elements typical of both developed and developing countries:
Similar rates to wealthy neighbors
But driven by economic hardship rather than development
The complex mix of market reforms and traditional structures
Mainly affects urban, educated, market-participating women
Methodology:
The study analyzed data from 1,610 North Koreans
Based on interviews with 120 defectors
Sample balanced for urban/rural distribution (44.9%/55.1%)
Used ordered probit models and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Verified no significant differences in patterns between early and late defectors
What to watch:
Recent state responses include:
January 2023 housing law prioritizing multi-child families
December 2023 official recognition of declining birth rates as a social issue
Potential for more policy interventions as demographic challenges grow